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The Judicial Process
Judge Lee E. Skeel*
T HE JUDICIAL PROCESS is that technique by which coherent
direction of thought on the basic principles of social rights
and duties is made available for judicial officers. No one will
contend that the judicial process should depend only on a judge's
personal concepts of justice, social rights and duties, or manner
of discerning the truth in litigation so that the rules of law may
be correctly applied. It is the duty of such officers diligently to
seek out the rules which must be used as the bases of judgment.
The sources from which they must seek help are as wide and
varied as the sum total of past and present human experience.
To begin with, some of the most obvious sources are the
settled declarations of law found in our Constitutions and Stat-
utes. True, the background of each of these specific declarations
of law is to be found in its historical development. The common
law may be employed to explain ambiguity in the words used or
the meaning to be ascribed to these written declarations, but
where there is no ambiguity and the facts are clear, there is
nothing for the judge to do but follow the printed word.
The custom of attempting codification of law, in the modern
sense, began under the civil system of Rome. Of course some
attempts long antedated Rome-such as those of the Bible, Baby-
lonia and Sumeria. These writings are historical landmarks in
preserving the legal philosophy of our past and present civiliza-
tion and can afford tremendous help in pointing the way to the
best administration of justice in an ever changing civilization.
Yet, attempts at codification, which have ever been with us, can
never provide complete mastery of the judicial system. Codes,
Constitutions and Statutes do not render the judge superfluous
nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. The written word
can never completely cover the varied fields of human relations.
* Of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Cleveland; President of Cleveland-
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[Editors' Note: This is the outline used by Judge Skeel in presiding as
Chairman of a recent Seminar For Municipal and County Court Judges
on "The Nature and Function of the Judicial Process." That seminar was
one of a series of ten weekly conferences for judges and judicial officers
and administrators, conducted as a public service by Cleveland-Marshall
Law School. Presided over by a judge or law professor in each case, the
discussion meetings attracted many jurists, public officials, attorneys, and
others from northern Ohio. Their enthusiastic participation and apprecia-
tion indicated that such seminar series offer a valuable vehicle for the
self-improvement of the Bench, Bar, Courts, and allied agencies.]
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Cardozo once said: "The same problems of method, the
same contrasts between the letter and the spirit, are living
problems in our own land and law. Above all, in the field of
constitutional law the method of free decision has become, I
think, the dominant one today. The great generalities of the
constitution have a content and significance that vary from
age to age. The method of free decision sees through the
transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind
them. * * * Codes and other statutes may threaten the ju-
dicial function with repression and disuse and atrophy. The
function flourishes and persists by virtue of the human need
to which it steadfastly responds. Justinian's prohibition of
any commentary on the product of his codifiers is remem-
bered only for its futility."
Dealing with the source of the law and the function of find-
ing the law is the inherent duty imposed upon the judicial office.
It has been said, of this, that: "Courts are to search for light
among the social elements of every kind that are the living force
behind the facts they deal with. The powers thus put in their
hands is great, and subject, like all power, to abuse; but we are
not to flinch from granting it." In the long run, "there is no
guaranty of justice except the personality of the judge."
Aside from the sources of the law found in Codes, Constitu-
tions and Statutes, the background of all rules guiding legal re-
lations in our time is to be found in study of the common law.
The habits of looking to the decided cases, and of following prec-
edent as the authority for settling legal controversies, have been
stabilizing factors in the development of our social rules.
Following that which has been said before in similar-facts
cases, that is, logically following precedent in deciding cases, in
the main explains much of the judicial process. But such a proc-
ess in no sense circumscribes the duty of a judicial officer in
composing social disputes. While a stable society requires uni-
formity in legal decision, it also requires growth in recognition of
advancing social standards. The desire not to have to work over
again that which has been done, in order to create the authority
of the case under consideration, must not be a stumbling block
to progress. The common law does not work from pre-established
truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived
from their deductivity. Its method is inductive, and it draws its
generalizations from particulars.
The process has been admirably stated by Munroe Smith:
In their effort to give to the social sense of justice artic-
ulate expression in rules and in principles, the method of the
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lawfinding experts has always been experimental. The rules
and principles of case law have never been treated as final
truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in
those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice.
Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule
which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be
unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may not be modified at
once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every single
case would make the development and maintenance of gen-
eral rules impossible; but if a rule continues to work in-
justice, it will eventually be reformulated. The principles
themselves are continually retested; for if the rules derived
from a principle do not work well, the principle itself must
ultimately be reexamined.
The line of inquiry to be pursued, where no precedent is
clearly in point, is to seek a logical development of the principles
to which the decided law already has given sanction. It has been
said "a judge should not mar the symmetry of the legal structure
by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and arti-
ficial exceptions unless for some sufficient reason which will com-
monly be the same consideration of history or custom or policy
of justice." (Cardozo). A judge must be logical as much as he
must be impartial. It is indeed disconcerting for a lawyer to have
a court decide issues of fact and law against him when he repre-
sents a plaintiff, and then for him to lose on identical facts when
representing a defendant. If several cases involve the same facts,
the several parties have a right to expect the same decision in
each.
Adherence to well established and unchallenged precedent
is desirable for the common good, and must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have confidence in the
administration of justice. Again, in the words of Cardozo:
But as a system of case law develop, the sordid contro-
versies of litigants are the stuff out of which great and shin-
ing truths will ultimately be shaped. The accidental and
transitory will yield to the essential and the permanent. The
Judge who molds the law by the method of philosophy may
be satisfying an intellectual craving for symmetry of form
and substance. But he is doing something more. He is keep-
ing the law true in response to a deep seated and imperious
sentiment. * * * In default of other tests, the method of
philosophy must remain the organ of the courts if chance
and favor are to be excluded and the affairs of men are to be
governed with the serene and impartial uniformity which is
of the essence of the idea of law.
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Such an analysis of the duty of the judge, in not conceiving
his work to be confined merely to deciding cases, but rather in
dealing with the controversies of litigants to be guided by the
basic philosophy of the rules (to which his work contributes) by
which society is to be governed in furtherance of harmony,
peace and prosperity, calls to mind the words of Lord Pollock in
his lecture on the Expansion of the Common Law:
For the law is not a collection of propositions but a
system formulated on principles, and although judicial de-
cisions are in our system, the best evidence of the principles,
yet not all decisions are acceptable or ultimately accepted,
and principle is the touchstone by which particular decisions
have to be tried. Decisions are made, principles live and
grow.
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